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Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining, and the Clean Development Mechanism

Hovi, Jon (Working Paper;2001:12)

While there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is Fearon (1998), who models international cooperation as a two-stage process in wh...

Estimating and managing uncertainties in order to detect terrestrial greenhouse gas removals

Baritz, Rainer, Rypdal, Kristin (Working Paper;2002:07)

Inventories of emissions and removals of greenhouse gases will be used under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and under the Kyoto protocol to demonstrate compliance with obligations. During the negotiation process of the Kyoto protocol it has been a concern that uptake of ca...

Market power in the market for greenhouse gas emission permits - the interplay with the fossil fuel markets

Mæstad, Ottar, Hagem, Cathrine (Working Paper;2002:08)

Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to leave Russa and other Eastern European countries with market power in the market for emission permits. Ceteris paribus, this will raise the permit price above the competitive permit price. However, Russia is also a large exporter of fossil fuels. A h...

Enforcing the climate regime: Game theory and the Marrakesh Accords

Hovi, Jon (Working Paper;2002:06)

This article reviews basic insights about compliance and “hard” enforcement that can be derived from various non-cooperative equilibrium concepts, and evaluates the Marrakesh Accords in light of these insights. Five different notions of equilibrium are considered – the Nash equilibrium, the subgame...

Group size effects in two repeated game models of a global climate agreement

Helland, Leif (Working Paper;2002:05)

What levels of total abatement can one hope for in a global climate agreement? Some potential answers to this question are provided by game theory. This working paper contains a critical discussion of two (prominent) game models that answer the question quite pessimistically. Both models take the n-...

Green electricity policy in the Netherlands: An analysis of policy decisions

van Wees, Mark, van Rooijen, Sascha (Working Paper;2003:08)

Over the last decades, fundamental changes in both market conditions and the national and international policy framework in the Netherlands can be observed. The Dutch Government has intervened in markets regularly, demonstrating fundamental shifts in policy and approach. This study aims to analyse t...

Option values and the timing of climate policy

Hans Asbjørn Aaheim, Froyn, Camilla Bretteville (Working Paper;2003:04)

This paper reconsiders the importance of irreversibilities in climate change policy. The model presented here captures the irreversibility of both climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions and abatement technology investments, both of which are subject to uncertainty that will necessarily chang...

An alternative to the Global Warming Potential for comparing climate impacts of emissions of greenhouse gases

Jan S. Fuglestvedt, Stuber, Nicola, Shine, Keith P. (Working Paper;2003:03)

The Global Warming Potential (GWP) is used within the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as a metric for weighting the climatic impact of emissions of different greenhouse gases. The GWP has been subject to many criticisms because of its formulation, but neve...

Enabling sustainable urban road transport in China: A policy and institutional perspective

Hu, Xiaojun, Zhang, X.L. (Working Paper;2003:02)

This paper is an effort to investigate the approach to sustainable urban road transport in Chinese mega cities with an emphasis on policy and institutional perspectives. The study links the major “unsustainabilities” of China’s urban road transport with those deficiencies in urban road transport pla...

Tough justice for small nations: How strategic behaviour can influence the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol

Hege Westskog, Steffen Kallbekken, Mæstad, Ottar, Hagem, Cathrine (Working Paper;2003:01)

This paper looks at how strategic considerations may play a role in the decision of whether or not to impose sanctions on Parties who are not in compliance with their commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. A member of the Enforcement Branch might have an incentive to vote for sanctions towards one non-c...