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Pigouvian tax aversion and inequity aversion in the lab

Steffen Kallbekken, Stephan Kroll, Todd Cherry

We use an experimental market with externalities to test whether inequality aversion could help explain the popularity of earmarking tax revenues. We find that voter opposition is not fully explained by material self-interest: Results indicate that preferences for fairness influence voting behavior, with greater inequality in tax revenue distribution negatively affecting the acceptability of the tax. In addition to this, we also discover a significant degree of tax-aversion in the votes. Our findings provide greater understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of the positive impact that earmarking has on the acceptability of Pigouvian taxes.

Mer detaljer

  • År: 2010
  • Tidsskrift: Economics Bulletin
  • Språk: English
  • Volum: 30
  • Hefte: 3
  • Side: 1914 - 1921
  • Issn: 1545-2921